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Abstract 
The 2008 crisis crystallised the trend towards ‘precarious’ labour market conditions which 
disproportionately affect young people. Few studies since the crisis, however, examine how 
young people understand and engage with their economic circumstances and industrial 
relations. This article draws upon rich and original data from focus groups and an online 
community exercise to examine the attitudes of young people in relation to the apparent 
‘normalisation’ of precarity in the post-crisis economy. It argues that although young people 
have internalised precarious labour market conditions, they recognise the abnormality of this 
situation. It shows that their view of these conditions as immutable, however, meaning they 
often fail to see value in conventional forms of trade union organisation. The article 
concludes by outlining a future research agenda around economic crisis, generational 
identities and the future of industrial relations. 
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Whilst the UK is currently experiencing record levels of employment, this headline figure 
masks the fact that, ‘two-thirds of the growth in employment since 2008 has been in 




Cominetti 2019: 6-7). Moreover, young people have experienced ‘above-average increases in 
the rate of atypical employment’ during this time (Clarke and Cominetti 2019: 42). The 
implications for industrial relations of the rise of insecure and precarious employment in 
many sectors is significant and has become central to academic and policy debate in the UK 
(and elsewhere) in recent years (e.g. Taylor 2017). 
Precarity can be understood broadly as a deviation from the standard employment 
relationship, with features including low pay, short-term contracts, faux self-employment, 
few or no guaranteed working hours and few employment rights and protections (see 
European Parliament Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 
2017; Grimshaw et al., 2016).1 Insecure employment is not new, especially in lower-skilled 
occupations, although it may have reached a new peak since the 2008 crisis (Prosser, 2016; 
see also Bessant et al., 2017; France, 2016). Indeed, two decades ago, Richard Sennett 
warned of ‘flexible capitalism’, wherein ‘uncertainty’ and ‘instability’ were becoming 
‘woven into the everyday practices of a vigorous capitalism’ (Sennett, 1998: 31; see also 
Beck, 2002). However, today’s young people are perhaps the first cohort to have experienced 
the shift towards precarity on a large scale, across occupational groups. In a landmark 2018 
book, the late Andy Furlong et al. refer to the spread of precarious labour market conditions 
in recent decades in the UK as ‘a new normality’, which has built up over decades and 
accelerated in the context of the crisis from 2008. This is an issue because, despite the fact 
that young people are increasingly likely to be employed in low paid and precarious 
positions, or suffer from underemployment (Booth, 2016; Gardiner and Gregg, 2017; Heyes 
et al., 2016; Hodder and Kretsos, 2015), they are also less likely to confront such problems 
through traditional forms of trade unionism (Tailby and Pollert, 2011).  
This article seeks to develop our understanding of this ‘new normal’ of precarity by 




et al. (2018: 92-96) acknowledge, young people would have to acknowledge precarity as a 
largely immutable reality in order for it to have been fully ‘normalised’. We thus define the 
‘normalisation’ of precarity in terms of whether and how young people come to view the 
conditions of labour market precarity outlined above as fixed features of their economic 
existence, rather than an aberration they expect to pass. As such, drawing a link between 
wider labour market processes and young people’s attitudes to trade unions, we interrogate 
the notion of ‘normalisation’ by considering if, how and why young people seek to operate 
and succeed (or simply survive) within this economic environment, rather than resist it 
(through, for example, forms of collective action). 
Our specific contribution to scholarship is to qualitatively examine young people’s 
understandings of the economy, work and industrial relations in order to develop our 
understanding of how the material conditions of this ‘new normal’ is being experienced. The 
research is thus underpinned by two key research questions. Firstly, what is the attitude of 
young people towards work, their economic circumstances and economic futures more 
broadly? Secondly, how are traditional industrial relations, including the role of trade unions, 
seen by today’s young people? These questions will be relevant across many economies, 
though we focus here on young people in the UK. The article explores these issues through 
the presentation of original, qualitative data emerging from a series of focus groups and an 
online community exercise with young people aged between 18 and 25, conducted in October 
2017.  
The existing literature on young people’s attitudes to work and industrial relations is 
divided between more attitudinal approaches, which highlight a lack of ‘demand’ for unions 
amongst young workers (see Cennamo and Gardner, 2008; Cogin, 2012; Ng et al., 2010), and 
more structural approaches which highlight the way in which changing labour market 




Transcending this dichotomy, however, our approach here is exploit the economic crisis as a 
key event and assess how significant labour market changes may be altering attitudes towards 
work and industrial relations amongst young people in the UK.  
There are surprisingly few such studies focusing on the post-crisis period, and certainly 
very few focused on the UK. Frustratingly, studies rarely make links between work-related 
attitudes and understandings of the wider economic context. There have also been none 
focused on 18-25-year-olds; whilst most research on young workers studies the ‘millennial’ 
age range, our research is focused solely on those who, as adults, have never known anything 
but the post-crisis economy. Moreover, trade unions (or their absence) are clearly an 
important part of the labour market landscape for workers, and as such there has been a 
growing scholarly interest in their renewal in conditions of precarity in recent years 
(Croucher and Wood, 2017; James and Karmowska, 2016; Kretsos, 2011; Marino et al., 
2018; Upchurch et al., 2012). As such, analysing attitudes to trade unions serves our wider 
objective of understanding the normalisation of precarity, given that such attitudes may 
indicate the extent to which young people are prepared to challenge prevailing labour market 
conditions. Do young people see precarity as impeding their exercise of control over their 
working lives, and are they looking to trade unions to reassert control? 
The article contends that young people’s experience of the ‘new normal’ of precarious 
labour market conditions has been internalised and thus normalised within their attitudes to a 
significant degree. This does not mean, however, that labour market changes have been 
accepted passively or unknowingly (cf. Furlong et al. 2018). Rather, there is a recognition 
amongst these young people of the novelty of their socio-economic circumstances, and thus 
frustration and anger at the nature of these circumstances. Nevertheless, we also find, as 
others have (see Worth 2018) that young people feel that insecure labour market conditions 




people focus on how they can succeed within this inherited structure rather than on pursuing 
structural change. Our research shows that antipathy towards trade unions, even if trade 
unionism is conceived in fairly positive terms, can be associated with this perspective, insofar 
as trade union membership is not deemed particularly helpful to young people plotting their 
career while navigating precarious labour market conditions.  
The article first briefly surveys the existing literature on the attitudes of young people 
to work and industrial relations (including trade unions), and then details the methodology in 
Section Three. Section Four presents evidence from the focus groups, organised thematically 
according to an inductive analysis of our empirical material, in the following sections: ‘the 
economic context’, ‘the labour market, good work and economic security’ and ‘industrial 
relations and trade unions’. Section Five pulls together our analysis of the ‘attitudes to 
precarity’ and ‘ambivalence to trade unions’, before we conclude in Section Six. In doing so, 
the article poses a challenge to the notion that conventional forms of trade union activity will 
succeed in mobilising workers to challenge precarity and marks out a new research agenda 
around how generational identities transform in the wake of economic crises. Ultimately, 
however, while in a material sense precarity may have been normalised for today’s young 
people, further research is required to establish the attitudinal implications of this across the 
lifecourse. 
 
The existing literature on attitudes to work and trade unions 
The existing research has reported a substantial cohort effect on union density, demonstrating 
that a decline in union membership can be explained by the replacement of older, more 
unionised workers, by younger cohorts who tend to be less unionised (see Bockerman and 
Uusitalo 2006; Bryson and Gomez 2005). That is, opposed to factors such as, for example, in 




membership over the past three decades or so can be explained by an increase in what Bryson 
and Gomez (2005) describe as ‘never-membership’ amongst younger workers. The reasons 
for this cohort effect are contested, however. The literature is divided between more 
attitudinal approaches, which highlight a lack of ‘demand’ for unions, and more structural 
approaches, which highlight either the way in which changing labour market composition 
restricts union activity or ‘supply-side’ issues around the capacity of trade unions themselves 
to organise workers.  
On the demand-side of this debate, a significant amount of academic work supports 
the popular notion that ‘millennial’ or ‘Generation Y’ workers (born between the early 1980s 
and the late 1990s) are individualistic, uncommitted to their jobs, and have unreasonably high 
expectations from their employers (and, relatedly, also reject the collectivist underpinnings of 
trade unionism) (Oliver, 2006). A large part of this literature finds that younger generations 
of workers place a greater emphasis on both extrinsic values (such as a higher salary) and 
work freedoms (such as working time flexibility) than previous generations (see Cennamo 
and Gardner, 2008; Cogin, 2012; Ng et al., 2010). Eddy Ng, Linda Schweitzer and Sean 
Lyons utilise data from a Canadian survey of undergraduate students, for instance, to suggest 
that millennials place ‘the greatest importance on individualistic aspects of a job’. Half of the 
respondents surveyed, they argue, were uncommitted to their workplace in the long-term, 
signifying a ‘significant shift away from the career norms of the past’ is evident (Ng et al., 
2010: 289; see also Cogin, 2012: 2287). 
We can recognise that in some senses these attitudinal differences are transitory, 
rather than defining of a whole cohort over time. For instance, the macro data shows us that 
the ‘probability of being unionized follows an inverted U-shaped pattern in age, maximizing 
in the mid-to late 40s’ (Blanchflower 2007: 1; see also Hodder 2015: 315). That is, even if 




stage of their career, as they grow older they tend to become increasingly receptive to 
unionisation. Yet we do also know, for instance, that workers aged 16-24 make up an 
increasingly small percentage of unionised British workers in comparison to two decades ago 
(see BEIS 2018: 15). Does this reflect a significant shift in the attitudes of young people 
towards trade unions or are there more structural factors at play? 
The above literature, which views the heightened labour market precarity of young 
people and subsequent lack of demand for unionisation as a natural product of their ‘essential 
youthfulness’ (Yates 2017), has been challenged robustly within the literature. Brenda 
Kowske, Rena Rasch and Jack Wiley draw upon repeated opinion surveys over an eighteen-
year period, with data collected from a diverse sample of over 115,000 employees in the US 
to examine changing work attitudes. Though noting some small attitudinal shifts across 
generations, on balance the authors argue it is more useful to think in terms of ‘generational 
similarities’ (Kowske et al., 2010; see also the Finnish study reported in Pyöriä et al., 2017). 
Methodological differences may explain some of these contrasting findings, with time lag 
studies, where attitudes among different generations at the same age are assessed over time, 
more likely to dispute the notion that today’s young people are radically different to older 
cohorts. A review of the evidence by Jennifer Deal, David Altman and Steven Rogelberg 
shows that most of this research ‘finds a few small statistical differences, but the differences 
are few and modest at best’ and that there is no evidence ‘of the types of sweeping 
differences in attitudes, orientations, and work ethic that populate the popular press’ (Deal et 
al., 2010).  
As Vandaele (2012: 203) notes, ‘the discrepancy between young workers’ positive 
attitudes towards unions and their low unionization rate’ can best be explained with reference 
to labour market structure. That is, youth employment rates are lower than the working 




end, or “poor” quality jobs, in certain sectors’, making trade unions less accessible (Tailby 
and Pollert, 2011: 503; Hodder and Kretsos 2015: 4). Young workers ‘tend to work in sectors 
that are less covered by union membership, union representation and collective bargaining’ 
(Vandaele 2012: 204; see also Freeman and Diamond, 2003). As a result, ‘the union density 
differential between young and adult workers’ is due to issues within labour markets which 
pose supply-side constraints, such as a lack of information within the workplace on how or 
why to join a union, rather than a lack of demand for union representation per se (Bryson et 
al. 2005: 155; see also Tailby and Pollert, 2011: 518-20).  
By and large, structural accounts of the significance of changing labour market 
conditions, alongside large-scale time-lag attitudinal studies, strongly rebut claims that young 
people are today somehow distinctly more anti-trade union than past cohorts. Yet, whilst 
structural arguments highlight the relative weakness of attitudinal approaches, from a 
theoretical perspective it is important to maintain an understanding of the relationship 
between the two. The attitudinal-structural dichotomy within the literature should not prohibit 
a discussion of the relationship between changing labour market structures and the way in 
which young workers understand the labour market and industrial relations. This is 
particularly relevant in a context marked by significant labour market and wider economic 
upheaval, such as that which followed the 2008 economic crisis. This article’s analysis, 
therefore, remains alive to how structural economic changes may have important knock-on 
effects for the attitudes of young workers in the post-crisis labour market. So far, there is 
relatively little work in this area and even less which helps us to understand the attitudes of 
young workers towards trade unions in the context of the ‘new normal’ of labour market 
precarity post-crisis (see Furlong et al. 2018).  
Research on young workers in the US by Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Rayna Amber 




Study and finds that extrinsic values (for example, desiring a higher salary) have weakened 
since the crisis, with the young faced with higher unemployment and reduced job security, 
incomes, and advancement opportunities. In the UK, there is some limited non-academic 
literature on this issue which points to growing anxieties among young people regarding post-
crisis economic conditions, which seem to lead to a more pragmatic set of expectations 
regarding the workplace (obviously, establishing whether such anxiety would have been 
present anyway, had the ‘great moderation’ continued, is impossible) (Cabinet Office, 2014; 
IpsosMORI, 2017).  
This survey-based data is valuable for highlighting large-scale shifts in attitudes in the 
post-crisis period. However, this strictly quantitative approach to studying attitudes can be 
liable to miss the subtleties of shifting attitudes or fail to notice important contradictory 
tendencies or ‘gaps in explanatory language’ in the way young workers make sense of the 
world around them (see Worth 2018: 1). Once we dive into this issue, we see that there is a 
more complicated story at play. Franceschelli and Keating (2018: 2S), drawing upon 
interviews with young British workers, highlight a contradiction that exists between the 
actual labour market conditions facing young workers and their own apparent optimism 
concerning their own economic circumstances as a result of their ‘faith in the ability of hard 
work to improve future life opportunities’. Similarly, Leccardi (2017: 348) utilises cross-
national survey and case study data to show that despite high levels of uncertainty, young 
people across Europe appear to be ‘interpreting uncertainty as a window for new possibilities 
and the unexpected, a potentially risky but positive experience’.  
Furlong et al. (2018: 92) set out one way of interpreting this, depicting today’s young 
workers as ‘boiled frogs’: as precarious labour market conditions have intensified – or 
normalised – over recent decades, each subsequent cohort has little reason to question the 




‘common sense’. The ‘boiled frogs’ thesis thus presents young workers as passive receivers 
of structural change, rejecting the idea of young workers being part of an angry, anxious and 
alienated new class of precariat (see Standing 2011). Rather, utilising Understanding Society 
data, Furlong et al. suggest that young workers’ experience is more fragmented across the 
labour market, but is generally characterised by a more passive acceptance of the ‘new 
normal’ of precarity, with young people gradually building these trends into their 
expectations and understanding of the economic order (see Furlong et al. 2018: 92-96). As a 
result, they suggest, ‘there is now a widespread belief that the ability to manage life projects 
through the development of effective navigation skills places an increased emphasis on the 
importance of agency in determining outcomes’ (Furlong et al. 2018: 96). Such literature 
poses the question of whether young people have passively accepted long-term structural 
changes to labour markets or not. Our study seeks to examine this idea further. 
The above literature, moreover, does not directly assess the impact of these changes for 
industrial relations. In the wider literature, post-crisis research from psychology, based upon 
evidence from the United States and Europe, suggests that while the crisis may have 
sharpened some individualistic tendencies amongst young workers, a new form of 
‘cooperative individualism’ is more prevalent than a ‘me-first’ sentiment (Schoon and 
Mortimer, 2017: 5). Utilising survey data from Australia, the US and the UK, Vromen et al. 
(2015) provide further evidence of this. They highlight the way in which, despite a rise in 
materialist concerns post-crisis, young workers have come to frame their concerns differently 
to older generations, with concepts around ‘opportunity’ and ‘choice’ dominating their 
understandings of the labour market, rather than notions such as ‘class’ (Vromen et al. 2015). 
That is, as a result of structural changes to labour market conditions, young people appear to 
be internalising notions of choice and their own entrepreneurial abilities when considering 




unions in the UK have sought to develop their appeal to young workers, moving away from a 
focus on collective identity towards developing a sense of how unions might be a ‘vehicle’ to 
help young workers ‘succeed’ (TUC, 2016: 32-3). 
Building on the existing literature, then, this study seeks to examine the attitudes of 
young adults in the UK are being shaped in the contemporary post-crisis economic 
environment, particularly in the context of growing labour market precarity, and what 
implications this has for their view of industrial relations. It does so on the basis of needing to 
appreciate the link between structural economic changes and how young workers come to 
make sense their own position within the labour market and, in particular, the role of trade 
unions. Recognising that such structural shifts can lead to the development of new attitudes 
which may be subtle, complex and even contradictory in nature, we approach the study 
through an agent-centred methodological approach.   
 
Research methods 
In order to achieve this form of analysis, we utilise a series of focus groups, plus an online 
‘community’ exercise, which works like an online focus group conducted over a longer 
period of time. Focus groups are an increasingly popular methodological tool for 
understanding the views and experiences of labour market actors (see Hurrell et al.: 2012; 
Roche et al. 2014; Korkmaz 2018) and were deemed highly appropriate for our study for two 
principal reasons. Firstly, our interest in the ‘normalisation’ of novel forms of work and 
industrial relations represents a rather embryonic empirical agenda and focus groups were 
deemed to be an efficient mechanism for developing our understanding of attitudes to 
precarity among a particular age cohort. Secondly, and relatedly, we were explicitly 
interested in capturing the interaction of participants, or more precisely, in capturing the ideas 




study the process through which ‘key sub-groups collectively contest and justify the actions 
of elite political actors via shared values’ (Stanley, 2016: 236). This benefit of the focus 
group method is clearly aligned to our interest in shared understandings of precarity’s 
implications. While we include many individual comments from group discussions in the 
presentation below, the shared sentiments expressed in discussion (including agreement 
indicated non-verbally) are also key data. In this sense, focus groups are ‘more than the sum 
of separate interviews’ because of the way in which participants ‘both query each other and 
explain themselves to each other’ (Morgan 1996: 139). 
 Following the methodological literature’s finding that four to six focus groups are 
appropriate before an information ‘saturation’ point is reached (Morgan, 1996: 144; Stanley, 
2014: 900), our study consisted of four 90-minute focus groups, conducted in three different 
locations: one in Manchester, one in Grantham and two in London. These locations were 
selected because of their geographical spread across England’s regions, their different 
populations and economic sizes: Manchester is a medium-sized city (< 1m population) in the 
North West of England, Grantham is a town (< 50,000 population) in the Midlands, whilst 
London is a large city (> 5m population) in the South East. All participants were aged 18-25 
(median age, 23), and there were 32 participants in total (between seven and nine in each 
group, with men and women equally represented). Participants were recruited locally and 
randomly, via personal approaches in leisure and commercial centres, and were incentivised 
to participate with a £40 reward, as practised and recommended in the existing focus group 
literature (Stanley 2014: 900-1).2 A single participant was in full-time education, but the vast 
majority were young people in work, with some currently seeking employment. Graduate and 
non-graduate participants were equally represented in three of the groups, however, in order 
to interrogate potential differences between graduates and non-graduates, one of the sessions 




Naturally, focus group methodology has its limitations; the group nature of the 
discussion limits opportunities to interrogate individual subjects’ views and can have a slight 
‘polarising’ effect if the group dynamic is dominated by particular individuals (Morgan 1996: 
140). Nevertheless, these considerations did not outweigh the potentially significant gains in 
rich qualitative data that focus groups can generate. Moreover, the small data pool from 
which focus groups studies derive their analysis (this study: N=32) does not lend itself to 
claims or findings with precise or measurable external validity. It is difficult, furthermore, to 
compare across different social groupings (e.g. class, age, ethnicity, etc.) with this type of 
data in the way that quantitative data allows for. The purpose of this research, however, was 
to develop a study that can contribute to our knowledge of young people’s attitudes towards 
labour market precarity and industrial relations through an in-depth analysis of the ideas of 
those young people and their interactions with each other (see Stanley 2016: 240). Unique to 
focus groups, this type of analysis gains its value from its ability to help to generate important 
insights or ways of understanding particular phenomenon that might otherwise be invisible to 
other (particularly quantitative) methodological approaches. This approach should be seen as 
a complement to other forms of scientific investigation, not as an alternative to them.   
The online ‘community’ exercise ran for three days in October 2017 and functioned 
like a social networking website. It was conducted principally to increase the geographical 
scope of the qualitative research and verify the focus group findings. The exercise gathered 
real-time qualitative insights into topics identical to those in the focus group. It consisted of 
eight female and nine male participants (recruited via social media), aged 18-25 (median age 
24) and based throughout England, in a closed online network responding to a total of 
seventeen tasks, such as forum discussions, image/video sharing and short polls. An online 





The research underpinning this article emerges from a wider research project conducted 
by the authors on the issue of young workers and industrial relations. Although the research 
programme was developed and managed by the authors, given the nature of the funding 
arrangements of the wider research project, the focus groups and online community were 
conducted by private research companies with the experience and resources to organise and 
host the events at short notice.3 Our overall research questions animated the drafting of 
specific questions and prompts. The first set of questions sought to engage participants in a 
discussion of the wider political and economic context. Following this broader conversation, 
a second set of questions asked about participants’ views of current labour market 
circumstances, particularly the rise of employment insecurity and how they understood the 
term ‘good work’. Finally, a third set of questions asked specifically about industrial 
relations, in terms of both knowledge of trade unions and views on their activities and 
services. Our reporting of the empirical data below, in Section Four, is set out according to 
this construction of our questions and is based upon inductive enquiry into the most critical 
aspects of what both the focus group and online participants told us. In order to conduct this 
inductive enquiry, all data from the focus groups and online community exercise were 
transcribed, and then coded and analysed in NVivo. Full focus group transcripts and other 
documentation of the data are kept on file by the authors.  
 
Focus group evidence 
The economic context 
Overall, the research revealed a broadly negative outlook amongst young workers on the 
wider economic context around them, the result of immediate concerns, such as Brexit, but 
importantly also the financial crisis of 2008. Discussion of the crisis legacy typically revolved 




cuts to public spending. This was a theme which cropped up across the different focus groups 
and the online community. Morosely, one participant in Manchester stated: ‘as a young 
person it’s all doom and gloom really, not much hope at the moment’ [Male, FG 
Manchester]. Another in the same group agreed, suggesting that: ‘it doesn’t feel like it’s 
getting any better and it doesn’t feel like there’s any light at the end of the tunnel’ [Female, 
FG Manchester]. Equally, in one of the London groups, another participant said: ‘since the 
crash in 2008, I think people at the top have actually done quite well … [whilst] the cost of 
living has gone up for most people, but the wages have stagnated, so it’s gotten harder for 
most’ [Male, FG London 1].  
This post-crisis sentiment inter-mingled with concerns about present economic 
circumstances, particularly the uncertainty caused by the Brexit vote. Brexit was particularly 
significant; it was mentioned by participants across all of the focus groups and in the online 
communities as an event that has thrown up greater uncertainty and put added strain on the 
cost of living as a result of the weakened pound. One participant said: ‘I tend not to think 
about my job future too much as it seems bleak, particularly with Brexit looming... my main 
aim is to make enough to pay rent and bills’ [Male, OC]. Specifically, several participants 
noted the added strain on the cost of living as a result of the weakened pound caused by the 
Brexit vote. One female participant in London suggested that the economy had ‘got worse 
since Brexit, Brexit is a huge part of it, I don’t think it’s ever been great, but I think 
particularly the pound has gone down so much since Brexit and jobs, job security has 
completely changed’ [Female, FG London 2]. Another in Grantham argued, ‘everything has 
just crashed since Brexit really … the pound has dropped, security, there is no real certainty 






The labour market, good work and economic security 
Competition to find work 
As a result of this post-crisis environment, including the perceived fallout from Brexit, 
participants were largely negative and pessimistic when discussing the state of the current 
labour market. There was a clear feeling amongst focus group participants that the crisis had 
impacted upon the nature of available jobs today. Young workers in London were in 
agreement that that the crisis had led to ‘a lot less permanent contracts’ and ‘a lot less 
security’ even when in a job [Male and Female, FG London 2]. While recognising that 
unemployment levels were low, participants commented upon the sheer number of applicants 
going for the same job. One participant noted that for some roles, websites such as LinkedIn 
allow you to view how many people are applying: ‘you can see you’re up against 400 people, 
which is just mental’ [Female, FG London 1]. Several graduate participants commented that 
employers had unrealistic expectations around prior work experience, even for entry-level 
jobs. Some reported undertaking several internships (including unpaid roles) in order to gain 
experience – but even these did not guarantee a ‘proper’ job. Another participant in London 
reflected on the demoralising nature of the job hunt: ‘even though I’m very qualified I can 
never get through to an interview. And for someone who just got a first in their degree and 
done so much extracurricular [activity], had two, three jobs, to then not get a really rubbishly 
paid low-level job’ [Female, FG London 2].   
The graduate-only group participants in London felt that the crisis had transformed the 
nature of the opportunities available to them. Typical of this perspective, one female 
participant said of her entry into the labour market: 
 
I was basically doing the equivalent of an assistant’s role but then not getting paid 




probably were just like, ‘oh, we’ll just get people in on a yearly thing, we’ll train 
them up, which takes a couple of weeks, and then they’ll do it for a year and class 
it as a placement and then get to pay them less’ [Female, FG London 1]. 
 
This type of issue was reflected in the online community. For example: 
 
Unemployment may be at a low but the jobs on offer aren't sufficient for many 
to progress in life due to factors such as low wages [Female, OC]. 
 
Since I finished school, I have noticed a shift in the labour market to a higher 
level of 'flexible-working', particularly zero-hours contracts [Male, OC]. 
 
Perceived competition for jobs is also a good example of how graduates and non-
graduates experienced the same phenomenon, but from different perspectives. For instance, a 
number of non-graduate participants commented upon creeping professionalisation and the 
growing pressure to obtain a degree. As female participant in Grantham commented, ‘it is 
harder to get your foot in the door if you haven’t got a qualification’ [Female, FG Grantham]. 
There was also a feeling, particularly among participants in Manchester and Grantham, that 
mass immigration was adding to a rise in competition for work, especially for lower-skilled 
jobs. Among graduates, there was an equally strong sense that competition for work was 
fierce. In London, for instance, one participant commented that ‘there are so many people 
going into uni[versity] and they’re just coming out all very similar because they’ve just got a 




feeling that employers now ‘look for far more than just a degree’ [Male, OC] and unfairly 
expect graduates ‘to have several years of experience in one field upon leaving university’ 
[Female, OC].  
 
Heightened precarity at work  
This increase in competition for work was seen to have had a direct impact on the nature of 
work and, in particular, the embedding of precarious employment practices into the everyday 
fabric of young people’s labour market experiences. Specific concerns included low pay, 
poor job quality (particularly in the retail sector), unreasonable employer expectations, 
insecurity and, to some extent, the prospect of automation. One female participant in 
Manchester remarked: ‘My boyfriend will always work until midnight and it’s absolutely 
ridiculous. [I think] Why don’t you just say, “I’m only paid to work till 5:00, 5:30”? He’s 
like, “No, because there’s a hundred other people that would happily take my job”, so you 
feel you have to put up with the working conditions’ [Female, FG Manchester, emphasis 
added]. The second part of this quote is telling; whilst the participant and her boyfriend are 
aware of the adverse nature of the conditions in which he is working, there is an acceptance 
that this is somehow the ‘norm’ and must, therefore, be ‘put up with’.  
There was moreover, a strong sense that precarity was a problem relatively unique to 
young people and that their experiences contrasted with those of previous cohorts. As one 
participant in Grantham remarked: ‘I feel like with parents and even grandparents, a 
generation [ago], you could stay in one job and do it forever ’til the end of time and I don't 
feel like it’s the same now. I don't think there’s as much certainty’ [Female, FG Grantham]. 
There was a clear feeling among graduate-only focus group participants that the specific 
conditions confronting young people today – most importantly, the nature of available jobs, 




restrictive than in the recent past. The prevalence of zero-hours contracts and the potential 
instability that these contracts cause was, for instance, identified in every focus group. 
The discussions around precarity also generated some interesting data on the extent to 
which today’s young people prioritise pay over other benefits of employment, as suggested 
by parts of the existing literature. A large number of participants argued that pay was the 
most important element of a ‘good’ job. This was, however, almost always put alongside job 
security. As one participant in London put it, in a job he simply wanted ‘longevity – just the 
confidence that you won’t be made redundant tomorrow’ [Male, FG London 1]. Similarly, 
the online community exercise revealed that participants mostly associated the term “good 
work” with the following words: meaningful; making a difference; satisfying; interesting; 
inspiring; challenging; and happening in a positive atmosphere/environment. Interestingly, 
however, when the online community were asked to describe their current jobs by selecting 
key words, the option ‘poor money’ was amongst the most commonly selected. This suggests 
that today’s young people are not necessarily motivated by pay above all else, yet are acutely 
aware that their pay, conditions and job security are not good enough. For instance, one 
participant noted that employer perks (like a ‘gin trolley’ on Fridays) were being used to 
disguise poor actual pay and conditions [Female, FG Manchester], whilst amongst all focus 
group participants there was a clear desire for employers to invest more in training and better-
quality apprenticeships. One participant in London lamented the way in which many 
employers were reducing pay and conditions as a result of squeezed profit margins: 
 
I think towards the bottom end of the [labour] market … the margins have been 
pushed quite a lot. If you were to go into a retail job, it doesn’t really matter 
what kind of grade, it could even be managerial, the terms and conditions tend to 




doing reorganisations and all sorts, possibly because their profit margin has been 
squeezed [Male, FG London 1]. 
 
Navigating a precarious labour market  
Despite the problems they were currently experiencing, it is illuminating that many 
participants expressed optimism about their own careers, particularly those in London. Some, 
especially graduates, expressed the view that the current labour market actually worked well 
for those equipped with the correct skills and qualifications, or the right attitude. A number of 
participants suggested that young people today need to make sure that they continue to learn 
new skills in order to stay relevant for changing labour market requirements. Several also 
expressed their desire to become self-employed, while others spoke of the benefits of having 
a ‘portfolio’ career, wherein one changes roles frequently and constantly learns new skills. 
 
I’m confident that I could get a better job, and I hope to get a better job, if I put 
effort into it. I have the education, I have the ability to do it. Eventually, in five or 
ten years, I’d be interested in setting up my own business and working for myself 
[Female, FG London 1]. 
 
I work in finance at the moment, but it is not really the thing that I want to carry 
on with… I take my job in finance as it is a good place to learn about how to 
structure a company, the tax system and everything else. I just take it as this is one 






We can see such views in relation to the apparent ‘normalisation’ of precarity among young 
adults. Clearly, these participants recognise they are employed in jobs which they are not 
happy with, for different reasons. Yet, while these would jobs would not necessarily all be 
defined as precarious, the individuals implicitly accept the demise of ‘jobs for life’ by 
articulating how they can, over the long term, take advantage of the freedom to switch 
industries, or become self-employed. The new normality is therefore not immutable – but its 
connotations are overcome primarily by accepting the individualist logic which underpins 
precarity. 
The danger, of course, is that these apparent benefits of contemporary labour market 
conditions serve to mask some of its less desirable elements. If participants are more willing 
to take responsibility for their own economic fate, rather than recognising the structural 
determinants of their present difficulties, they may also come to see more exploitative 
features of those conditions, associated with precarity, as normal or legitimate. For example, 
the discussion reflected participants’ lack of a critical perception of the ‘the gig economy’. 
Whilst, as discussed above, most recognised that the rise of zero-hour contracts and digital 
platforms for very short-term recruitment were constitutive of their problems, the vast 
majority did not, when pressed, express concern about gig economy practices in general. 
Indeed, many again commented that the gig economy could be a good thing for certain 
groups, such as students or carers who did not want to commit to a job.  
 
I think as a secondary job maybe [gig jobs could be positive] … if you want to do 
your normal job and then do two hours in the evening, it’s quite a good solution 





[The gig economy] is removing barriers for just earning some extra money … for 
people who just want a job on the side, I think it’s obviously beneficial [Male, 
London FG 2]. 
 
Of course, some of the difficulties inherent in gig employment and zero-hours contracts 
will have yet to be encountered by those aged 18-25 (e.g. the constraints on entering the 
housing market or managing family life), so their views may well evolve. Nevertheless, 
it is striking that participants see this relatively novel and often insecure way of making 
a living as a largely welcome development.  
 
Industrial relations and trade unions 
Overall, participants’ familiarity with trade unions was very low. In Grantham, for instance, 
the conversation displayed a widespread lack of understanding, with a number of participants 
admitting that they knew very little about unions. One respondent suggested that a company’s 
human resources department fulfilled the functions of a union [Female, FG Grantham], whilst 
another in the same session said that ‘you shouldn’t need [to pay] a fee’ for what trade unions 
do [Male, FG Grantham]. One male graduate participant in London similarly failed to 
distinguish between the societies of their student’s union and a trade union. In the online 
community exercise, most participants also admitted that they were not fully aware of the 
services offered by unions. Those who appeared more knowledgeable of trade unions 
typically came from public service backgrounds or had worked in blue collar occupations 
with traditionally high levels of unionisation (e.g. former factory workers).  
Among those not already in a union, there was fairly strong interest, in principle, for the 
kind of services trade unions offer. Indeed, when prompted to reflect on what an ideal trade 




pay and permanent contracts and facilitate access to training and legal advice; in other words, 
activities that trade unions already routinely carry out. On the other hand, several participants 
reported that they felt no immediate need to join a union, either because they did not have 
problems requiring union support or were not yet settled in their career. A participant in 
London commented: ‘I feel, first of all, that things are pretty much okay, and, second of all, 
that maybe I won’t be in this particular job long enough for it to make a big difference’ 
[Female, FG London 1]. Another in the same group stated he had not joined a union yet 
because ‘nothing bad’s happened to me yet’ [Male, FG London 1]. Interestingly, some of the 
participants even suggested that trade unions were forms of representation better suited to 
older workers. A female participant in London said: ‘There are lots of people who work at the 
gallery who’ve been there for donkeys’ years and they’re big into the union, but that’s not 
me, I’m a newer member of staff’ [Female, FG London 1]. 
Despite their often-precarious circumstances, there was little sense that participants 
considered their interests to be opposed to their employers’. Indeed, there were several 
negative aspects of union activity noted by participants, including an association, seen in 
negative terms, between trade unions and strike action – something which was mentioned in 
both the focus groups and the online community exercise. One participant, for instance, 
described union activity as ‘quite aggressive’ and suggested that it wrong to ‘hand over your 
problem to somebody else to deal with’ [Female, FG London 2]. Attendant to this was a 
feeling, expressed by a number of participants, that unions should not play an active role in 
party politics. There was an evident mistrust of union officials amongst some, insofar as their 
role was perceived as often a ‘stepping stone’ into politics. As one online community 
participant argued: ‘Trade unions should not get involved in politics… by joining a trade 
union, you are effectively showing support to the Labour Party and that is not what trade 




While many suggested that they could imagine joining a trade union at some point, 
and recognised the value of doing so, they clearly felt very little compulsion to join a union 
due to collectivist sentiment or solidarity with their colleagues, or even as a form of 
workplace protection. Rather, they suggested unions should focus on the more immediate 
positive benefits of union membership and how this might help their career advance. As one 
participant in London said: ‘I think that picture needs to be strong because I need to know 
why I’m joining this union and what they’re going to offer me’ [Female, FG London 2]. 
Some participants spoke of the benefit of having ‘flexible’ monthly contracts, rather than 
annual fees, and others suggested a ‘tailored service’ which would allow them to pay only for 
the union activities they deemed worthwhile. 
 
Analysis 
Attitudes to precarity 
The preceding evidence leads to this article’s principal finding, that precarious labour market 
conditions have been largely accepted by young adults in the UK (see Worth 2018; Furlong 
et al. 2018). However, this does not mean precarity has been welcomed, or that young people 
are entirely passive about this circumstance. The ‘new normal’ is in fact recognised as 
abnormal. There was clear anger expressed at the way in which current economic conditions 
of the post-crisis environment, including the legacy of the economic crisis and phenomena 
such as Brexit, negatively impact upon their position within labour market, there was little 
sense that it is possible to bring about change within the labour market.  
At the same time, however, our analysis highlights a resignation to a situation wherein 
precarity is largely immutable. In general, the young adults engaged by this research view 
their current difficulties in the workplace, or in finding work, as a product of heightened 




of this sentiment, it overlooks the structural context within which competitive relations are 
shaped. Accordingly, it seems many young people understand the prospect of improving 
labour market outcomes in terms of personal development and their ability to successfully 
navigate this more competitive environment (also identified by Ng et al., 2010; Furlong et al. 
2018). The evidence presented noted some attitudinal differences between graduates and non-
graduates, with the former more concerned about unmet expectations, for instance, and the 
latter more concerned by general degradation of economic conditions. Yet these are 
differences of degree rather than being fundamental in nature. 
It would be wrong to assume a purely passive process of acceptance regarding labour 
market conditions, as the ‘boiled frog’ thesis implies (see Furlong et al. 2018); today’s young 
people are very much conscious of the (relative) novelty of the economic conditions they are 
confronted with and concerned about this new regime. Our research suggests that while 
young people’s attitudes to work reflect, to a large extent, enduring, cross-generational 
ambitions for decent pay, security and opportunities to develop, today’s young are convinced 
that they are significantly less likely than previous cohorts to achieve these ambitions. They 
recognise the specific economic conditions of the post-crisis period, and how these affect 
young people. Paradoxically, however, it is the perceived immutability of the extant (post-
crisis and post-Brexit) economic environment amongst that renders young workers willing to 
accept these inherited conditions, encouraging them to focus more on succeeding (or simply 
surviving) within the status quo than on resisting precarity. Our analysis thus finesses the 
‘boiled frog’ argument. Young workers are conscious of the novelty of the intensification and 
spread of precarity, but predominantly respond in an individualistic rather than collectivist 
manner (arguably, this is a more meaningful normalisation of precarity, since it suggests that 
the underpinning norms have been internalised, but adjudicating on the precise meaning of 




Our findings in this regard are consistent with an emerging literature on post-crisis 
economic anxiety among young people, associated with a ‘revising down’ of career 
ambitions (Johnson et al., 2012). As noted above, some of the literature views the heightened 
labour market precarity of young people as a natural product of their youth, wherein young 
people are somehow more ‘comfortable’ with such arrangements (Yates, 2017). The more 
appropriate inference is that young people’s attitudes are being shaped by the material 
realities of their economic environment – an environment, marked by a post-Fordist 
accumulation regime based on low-productivity services industries, which pushes young 
people towards a willingness to accept low pay, greater precarity and fewer opportunities for 
progression (Yates and Clark, 2018). However, contra an emerging non-academic literature 
on ‘intergenerational justice’ (Cribb et al., 2013; Gardiner, 2017; Malik and Howker, 2010), 
we find little sense that today’s young people feel they have been unfairly treated by older 
cohorts, even though they are alert to the distinctiveness of contemporary labour market 
conditions.   
We could argue that today’s young people are merely coping with precarity – they do 
not necessarily accept its legitimacy. To some extent, this is true. Young people do indeed 
recognise the problems inherent in the post-crisis period. However, importantly, they do not 
seek help from elsewhere to resist, or simply cope with, these problems – they accept the 
responsibility to deal with this situation for themselves, despite recognising the economic 
crisis as the chief explanatory factor in the enhanced precarity they were experiencing. 
 
Ambivalence to trade unions 
The implications of this article’s research for (scholarship on) trade unions can be stated quite 
straightforwardly. We find strong support for the notion that young people in the UK lack 




explain the apparent ambivalence evident in our data? It seems clear that many young people 
do not consider extant forms of industrial relations to be well-suited to their lives, 
expectations and labour market experiences (perhaps in contrast to those of older cohorts). 
Instead, they appear to place more faith in their capacity to improve their economic 
circumstances (if this is indeed considered possible) under their own steam rather than 
through collective bargaining. In contrast, while disappointed by many employer practices, 
there is little sense of antipathy towards individual employers.  
The principle of trade unionism did attract some support among participants, which 
supports the notion that demand for workplace representation has not declined (Bryson et al., 
2005; D’art and Turner, 2008), but it is clear that most wanted trade unions to craft an offer 
more resonant to their individual ambitions for their careers. They were not particularly 
interested in being represented by trade unions in the workplace – with some young people 
particularly critical of unions seeking to represent members’ interests via political 
engagement, reflective of a wider ‘anti-politics’ sentiment. Of course, if young people lack 
knowledge of trade unions, it is perhaps because the information they are presented with is 
not deemed salient to their experience of industrial relations. We detected few differences 
between graduates and non-graduates regarding specific views on trade unions; interestingly, 
there were few, if any, explicit suggestions by participants that there might exist social class-
based divisions within age cohorts.  
Does this mean that it is correct to characterise today’s young people as more 
‘individualistic’ in the workplace than preceding cohorts? This is an important theme within 
the existing literature, especially that related to trade unions (including that published by 
trade union organisations in the UK). Our data suggest that it is difficult to make a 
straightforward claim either way. On the one hand, the focus group discussions reported here 




attitudes across recent cohorts (Deal et al., 2010; Kowske et al., 2010). The data suggest 
consistency between today’s young people and the existing literature on the meaning of 
‘good work’, and the balance of extrinsic and intrinsic motivations. On the other hand, 
however, it is clear from the discussions of trade unions that the young people engaged by 
this research were interested primarily in what trade unions could do for them, rather than the 
more solidaristic dimensions of trade unionism. For the most part, however, it is not clear that 
preferences or attitudes that have changed, but rather the material reality of the wider 
structural environment within which they are articulated; young people believe they have no 
choice but to seek to navigate precarity, and it may be that an aversion to trade unions arises 
not from an aversion to solidarity, but rather a perceived lack of relevance of traditional trade 
union activity to modern labour market precarity. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has reported on a new set of qualitative data on the attitudes to work, industrial 
relations and the economic environment more generally, with a relatively novel focus on 
post-crisis attitudes, and young people attaining adulthood after the 2008 crisis. That young 
people in the UK are experiencing precarity in the labour market as they transition from 
adolescence to adulthood is widely accepted, with Furlong et al. (2018) referring to ‘a new 
normality’ as insecurity spreads from marginal workers to those with in seemingly 
conventional employment conditions. Will this persist as today’s young people progress 
through the lifecourse? For ‘generational’ research, such questions are inherently ‘known 
unknowns’. However, the focus of the research presented in this article on attitudes to 
precarity suggests that young people largely expect precarity to persist, in part because they 





Whilst the young people engaged expressed anger and frustration with the economic 
conditions they face in the post-crisis environment, there was a resignation that these wider 
economic trends were ‘part and parcel’ of the economic structure and needed to be 
successfully navigated through, rather than overturned. This is reflected, furthermore, in 
relation to trade unions. Young people appear to be more focused on their own career rather 
than challenging precarious conditions through collective action. Of course, this may be 
because their perceptions of material reality compel them to choose a more individualistic 
and less solidaristic path. The condition of precarity is not accepted because it is deemed 
acceptable, but rather because it is seen as immutable; the key challenge, from the 
perspective of these young people, is to most effectively navigate this economic environment 
as an individual worker. 
The research presented here has enabled a novel engagement with the existing literature 
on age-related attitudes to work and industrial relations. While the findings are consistent 
with the recognition by some scholars of a more individualistic sentiment among today’s 
young people in countries such as the UK, we recognise also that longitudinal, quantitative 
studies tend to identify lifecourse effects whereby attitudes to labour market insecurity evolve 
as people grow older. Indeed, we find that what today’s young people understand as ‘good 
work’ is consistent with that reported for older cohorts. It is reasonable to assume therefore 
that today’s young workers will become less accepting of precarity as they age – and perhaps 
less individualistic in their attitudes towards overcoming precarity if they do not succeed in 
navigating their own path to a secure and rewarding livelihood. It is not our intention to 
suggest that traditional approaches to industrial relations are in terminal decline. 
Nevertheless, our analysis starts from the premise that there is a new normality, in 
terms of the spread and intensity of precarious labour market conditions – in a material sense, 




this apparent normalisation. We object to Furlong et al.’s depiction of today’s young people 
as ‘boiled frogs’, but it is of course necessary to recognise the rising temperature, and 
interrogate the attitudes this process has inspired. Much of the existing literature which 
captures the evolution of attitudes across the lifecourse utilises data from only the pre-crisis 
period. Ideally, the research underpinning this article would be supplemented by both large-n 
quantitative studies and small-n qualitative studies, both capturing the attitudes of more 
young people, and exploring these views in more depth. Longitudinal research on today’s 
young people would be extremely valuable, as would studies which segment precarious 
labour market conditions by industry. Any future research should further explore generational 
identities, and how they relate to other demographic characteristics. More granular research 
on young people and new forms of trade unionism (or work-based co-operation more 
generally) would also be welcome.  
Future research could also usefully focus on the attitudinal effect of economic crises; it 
is clear that the young people engaged by this research recognised the specific characteristics 
of post-crisis labour market conditions, but whether the experience of the 2008 crisis has had 
a direct impact on attitudes (and indeed a variable impact across age groups) is less clear. 
One of our most important findings is that today’s young people in the UK are conscious of 
precarity – and we tentatively suggest the experience of economic crisis, and the subsequent 
turbulence, is a factor in this attitudinal shift. If there is a new normality, it ironically 
manifests in young workers’ attitudes as a belief in the abnormality of their experiences. The 
related belief identified here in the immutability of precarity – whether warranted or 
otherwise – helps to explain some of the attitudinal tendencies identified elsewhere in the 
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1. Precarity can, however, also be a feature of standard employment, in industries which are 
volatile and very low-paid (meaning that a permanent contract is no guarantee of 
economic security). Arguably, however, this ‘hollowing out’ of standard employment is 
less common in the UK, where limited employment regulation has allowed atypical 
employment relations to spread more quickly (European Parliament Policy Department 
for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, 2017; Grimshaw et al., 2016). 
2. Participant selection consisted of specialist recruiters approaching young people in public 
places, primarily commercial centres. This approach ensured a high degree of 




was in work or seeking work, but to ensure approximately equal numbers of men and 
women. Recruiters excluded any potential participants who worked in marketing, had 
participated in any similar exercises in the past six months, or were not fluent in English. 
Given that focus group meetings were generally held several days after participants had 
been recruited, the £40 payment acted as an incentive to ensure attendance. As such, 
there is no reason to believe the payment distorted the representativeness of participants’ 
views to any extent. 
3. There were two main reasons for subcontracting this element of the research. Firstly, the 
funding model required us to recruit participants relatively quickly (based on screening 
criteria approved by the authors). Secondly, the research companies utilised had 
specialist experience in organising and delivering focus groups and online community 
exercises. Populus has significant experience in focus group research with young people, 
and the focus group convenor, Claudia Chwalisz, has a background in studying young 
people as a political scientist. On the other hand, Incling is a specialist provider of the 
services required to operate the online community exercise. The authors managed these 
research companies and directed how the research events were conducted. 
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